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The Ignoble Savage 
Racism, Myth and the Anthropological Machine  
Alberto Toscano 
 
You civilized peoples, who are for ever 
speaking foolishly about Savages and Barbarians—
soon, as  d’Aurevilly says, you will have become too 
worthless even to be idolaters. 
- Charles Baudelaire, Intimate Journals 
 
The marks and mediations of political turmoil in the writings of Furio Jesi are at once patent 
and anything but mechanical. In 1968, interpellated by the May events, he registered the rift 
with his erstwhile mentor in the study of mythology, the Hungarian scholar Karl Kerényi, in 
words of reverberant intensity: 
 
If fate dictates that I should be forced to address these words to the person whom I’ve considered 
my teacher ever since adolescence, it means the times are particularly dark. I doubt, what’s more, 
that they’ll brighten before first becoming even darker—before, that is, reaching the extreme 
point of crisis. This crisis will probably unfold in the streets and be fought with weapons; a crisis in 
which even a teacher and a disciple, a father and a son, will concretely find themselves to be 
enemies, in opposite camps.1 
 
And yet the eventually unfinished project which these words foreshadowed, Spartakus, 
though it channelled that intensity into one of the most singular reflections we possess on 
myth, time and revolt, eschewed familiar registers of political address and position-taking. 
Instead, it elucidated the symbolic impasses and undercurrents of contemporary tumults 
through a meticulous immersion into the nexus of myth and literature around 1919.2 This 
practice of detour and détournement, or repetition and recovery, is perhaps even more 
evident in Jesi’s abiding attention, throughout the 1970s, to that forbidding complex of 
attitudes and mentalities he provisionally defined under the heading of ‘the culture of the 
right’. In a moment like our own – in which a transnational mutation of that culture is bullishly 
pervasive, and when the Italian Minister of the Interior, the leader of a party that effectively 
‘technicized’ the grotesque myth of a Northern Italian ethnos (‘Padania’), can be heard urging 
the denaturalisation of Italian Romani – it is worth dwelling with this dimension of Jesi’s 
intellectual production. Jesi’s enquiries into the right’s political mythologies can be taken as 
a response not so much to May 1968 but – to cite a particularly transformative date in Italian 
political history – 12 December 1969, the day of the bombing of the National Bank of 
Agriculture in Milan’s Piazza Fontana3 and the inauguration of the ‘strategy of tension’ that 
                                                      
1 Furio Jesi and Károly Kerényi, Demone e mito. Carteggio 1964–1968, ed. Magda Kerényi and Andrea Cavalletti 
(Macerata: Quodlibet, 1999), 117. Also quoted in Andrea Cavalletti, ‘Introduction’, in Furio Jesi, Spartakus: The 
Symbology of Revolt, ed. Andrea Cavalletti, trans. Alberto Toscano (Calcutta and London: Seagull Books, 2014), 
6. 
2 See also the essay by Ricardo Noronha in this issue. 
3 Jesi intervened directly, through his political journalism, in the debates around Piazza Fontana – the 
scapegoating and likely murder of the framed anarchist suspect Giuseppe Pinelli was a signal contemporary case 
of the ‘persecution of the different’ that Jesi would seek to explore in his ‘ignoble savage’ project. See Furio Jesi, 
‘A chi giova la strage’, Resistenza. Giustizia e libertà XXIII, 11 (November 1969), 1; ‘Prenderli ad ogni costo anche 
se innocent. L’uso politico dell’inchiesta sugli attentati’, Resistenza. Giustizia e libertà, XXIV, 1 (January 1970), 2; 
Angelo d’Orsi and Furio Jesi, ‘La “verità” di regime. Dramma e farsa nel processo Calabresi-Baldelli, Resistenza. 
Giustizia e libertà, XXIV, 12 (December 1970), 5-6. These texts are cited by David Bidussa in his introduction to 
saw the Italian deep state find common cause with (or insistently manipulate) a galaxy of far 
right and neo-fascist movements whose progeny are still holding confidently forth, for 
instance in that particularly effective collective political entrepreneur that is the Casa Pound 
movement.4 One could suggest here that the passage from the Kerényian juxtaposition 
between genuine and technicized myth which governs Jesi’s mythological critique of the 
1960s5 to the thematic of the mythological machine that will occupy him until his premature 
death in 19806 should at least in part be referred back, not just to a far-reaching critique of 
the far left’s relation to myth, but to the enduring force of myth in the thinking of reaction. 
This force goes beyond ‘technicization’ and gives us a powerful insight into some of the 
deeper determinants of Western political rationality as a whole – whence also the unsettling 
reversibility of political myth from left to right. As Jesi declared in an interview to the weekly 
L’Espresso shortly before his death, the culture of the right is 
 
the culture within which the past is a kind of homogenised pap that can be modelled and formed 
as one sees fit. The culture in which there prevails a religion of death or even a religion of 
exemplary deaths. The culture in which it is declared that there exist values beyond debate, 
signalled by capitalised words, especially Tradition and Culture, but also Justice, Freedom, 
Revolution. In brief, a culture made up of mythological authority and certainty about the norms 
of knowing, teaching, commanding and objecting. The greatest part of our cultural patrimony – 
including of those who in no way wish to be on the right – is today a cultural residuum of the right.7 
 
Jesi’s harsh emphasis in his writings of the 1970s on the nexus of myth and power politics also 
draws on his diagnosis of the culture of the right’s insidious contemporary hegemony. In this 
respect, Jesi will come to define myth and mythology in a far more starkly negative light than 
                                                      
the new edition of Furio Jesi’s book on the blood libel, the figure of the vampire and the mythological machine: 
David Bidussa, ‘Retorica e grammatica dell’antisemitismo’, in Furio Jesi, L’accusa del sangue. La macchina 
mitologica antisemita (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007), x fn 9. 
4 In English, see Tobias Jones, ‘The fascist movement that has brought Mussolini back to the mainstream’, The 
Guardian, 22 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/22/casapound-italy-mussolini-
fascism-mainstream (accessed 8 July 2018). 
5 See Furio Jesi, Letteratura e mito (Turin: Einaudi, 2002 [1968]), as well as Enrico Manera’s essay in this issue. 
6 Cavalletti dates the beginning of Jesi’s work on the ‘mythological machine model’ and the origins of the 
‘mythological fact’ to Spring 1972. See his editorial note in Furio Jesi, Il tempo della festa, ed. Andrea Cavalletti 
(Rome: nottetempo, 2013), 59. I take this opportunity to thank Andrea Cavalletti for the precious suggestions 
and editorial information concerning the place of the savage in Jesi’s work.  
7 Furio Jesi, Cultura di destra. Con tre inediti e un’intervista, ed. Andrea Cavalletti (Rome: nottetempo, 2011), 
287. See also Enrico Manera, ‘Religioni della morte. I volti della Cultura di destra in Furio Jesi’, Doppiozero, 11 
May 2011, http://www.doppiozero.com/dossier/cultura-di-destra/religioni-della-morte-i-volti-della-cultura-di-
destra-furio-jesi, accessed 13 June 2018. In his introduction to the book on the culture of the right, Jesi draws 
on an expression of Oswald Spengler (whose The Decline of the West, translated by the far right philosopher 
Julius Evola, Jesi had helped to produce a critical edition of in 1978) to get at the essence of this ‘residuum’, 
namely the persistence of what Spengler had called ‘ideas without words’, and which the German thinker had 
treated as a kind of blood inheritance. Jesi notes that left-wing jargon (sinistrese) is often saturated with such 
ideas without words. He goes on to reflect on the likenesses between the flags and pennants to be found in 
museums of the Risorgimento, in the Mostra della Rivoluzione fascista but also in the hiding places of the Red 
Brigades (such as the red silk flag embroidered with the five-pointed star found in one of the group’s bases in 
October 1978). As Jesi observes, this ‘continuity is not one of words, but stems from the choice of a language of 
ideas without words, which believes it can speak truly (dire veramente), and thus to say and at the same time 
conceal in the secret sphere of symbol, that it can do without words, or better neglect any undue preoccupation 
with modest symbols, like those words that are not watchwords or slogans’. For Jesi, it is in grasping the 
functioning of these ideas without words, and their bond with the mythological machine, that we can renew the 
study of ideology (a key term in his rift with Kerényi). Cultura di destra, 27-8.  
we could find in earlier work. He will thus write of myth as the ‘presumed mysterious heart, 
the presumed immobile and invisible motor of a machine that can have many uses’ and note 
that mythology ‘is always the mythology of a power’. And, with reference to Walter Benjamin, 
he will declare that ‘the perseverance of myth is already sufficiently demonstrated by the use 
of myth on the part of those who possess and wield Gewalt’.8 
 
In this essay, I want to home in on one particular facet of Jesi’s preoccupation with the 
mythological machine and the culture of the right, namely the figure of the ‘savage’. As 
Andrea Cavalletti has detailed in his editorial contribution to the second edition of Jesi’s 
Cultura di destra (The Culture of the Right), the latter’s reflection on these matters was 
channelled into an unfinished commissioned pedagogical project – partially drafted in 1973-
74 – with the working title of Il cattivo selvaggio. Teoria e pratica della persecuzione dell’uomo 
‘diverso’. In what follows, starting from a brief summary of what remains of this abandoned 
project, I want to follow the figure of the savage across a series of writings from this 
particularly intense period of Jesi’s intellectual production, with particular attention to his 
study on the anti-Semitic blood libel and his reflections on anthropology and epistemology. 
Though not a reconstruction of the ’73-74 project on racist persecutions, the construction of 
a constellation of the ‘savage’ drawing from Jesi’s works of the 1970s aims to sketch out how 
his profoundly unique vantage point and method could inform contemporary debates on 
race, alterity and anthropology, as well as further contributing to the broader effort to identify 
in the ‘savage’ a key operator of demarcation and inferiorisation in the constitution of 
dominants image of rationality, history and politics.  
 
The horror of difference 
As Cavalletti notes, Il cattivo selvaggio was commissioned by the publisher Paravia in 1973, 
for whom Jesi had just completed an anthology of Ancient Greek texts on myth and history –  
La vera terra, introduced by Georges Dumézil – intended for high school students in the liceo 
classico. This second commission was for an introductory and interdisciplinary text on issues 
of race and racism aimed at middle school (scuola media) students. Though unfinished, 
research materials from this project went into the drafting of Cultura di destra and also 
accompanied Jesi’s study into the blood libel and the mythological machine of anti-Semitism 
(on which more below). The outline of the project signals that, notwithstanding (but also in 
part because of) its target audience, the project on the ‘ignoble savage’ was ambitious in 
scope, and indicative of Jesi’s singular ability to think outside of established frameworks. Jesi 
divided the project into five chapters. The first, on the same (gli uguali, also ‘the equal’) and 
the different (i diversi), was to begin with examples of racial persecution that would be 
familiar to his young readers, namely the Southern proletariat from the perspective of Italian 
Northeners and American Blacks. We can already note in this pairing Jesi’s farsighted (and at 
the time rather unusual) grasp of race as a question also internal to the Italian or European 
scene. The chapter was then intended to anatomise, through a selection of documents, the 
way in which differences came to be occasions of persecution and to relate these to parallel 
instances in ‘the first colonial regimes’, namely to ‘the differences between the civilised and 
the savage at the moment of the first relationships between European and the different’9 
within the framework of ethnocentrism. Chapter two, ‘the savage, bad soldier’ would then 
                                                      
8 Furio Jesi, ‘Scienza del mito e critical letteraria’, in Esoterismo e linguaggio mitologico. Studi su Rainer Maria 
Rilke (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2002 [1976]), 23-8. 
9 Cultura di destra, 265. 
cover how racial difference – in the guise of supposed vices and shortcomings – was at stake 
in the figure of the ‘good soldier’, a crucial example of the ways in which the different come 
to be separated from the same (or the equal). The model of the ‘good soldier’ is a particularly 
‘transparent’ instance for Jesi because it is ‘organically connected to the social and ideological 
structures of the “racist international”’10 – the latter term being another salient example of 
Jesi’s intent not to relegate racism to an ‘other scene’ but to see it in its historical, ideological 
and structural globality. Chapter three and four in the book outline were then to be devoted 
to two further models. First, the ‘bad worker’, in which Jesi proposed to explore the 
articulation between the ideology of a full assimilation of the other as worker for the sake of 
successful exploitation, on the one hand, and the dynamics of racist devaluation, ‘cultural 
aristocracy’, and formal and internal colonialism that accompanied this ideology, on the 
other. Then, ‘the savage as minor’, in which Jesi proposed to develop the theme of the 
incapacity of the different to self-govern, and the paternalist theme of education into 
sameness. It is in the brief abstract for this fourth chapter that Jesi sketches the political core 
of the project, in what would seem a conscious nod to Walter Benjamin’s notion of a ‘new 
barbarism’: 
 
The political movements that aim at the self-government of the savage and the abolition of the 
exploitation of the different: they are movements that support barbarism against civilisation (and 
thus also class struggle against collaboration with the exploiter).11 
 
The book’s final chapter was to be entitled ‘Danger: Others!’ (Pericolo: diversi!) in order 
explicitly to recall the Nazi posters against the resistance, with their warnings of Achtung 
Banditen! and Banditen Gefahr (and we could also think here of the philosopher Pietro 
Chiodi’s remarkable partisan diari, Banditi). It was meant to recapitulate the documentary 
phenomenology of persecution established in the earlier chapter by delving into ‘examples 
of the most aberrant superstructures created around the load-bearing structures of racism 
and of “discriminations of exploitation”’.12 This chapter was thus to serve as a kind of 
‘diorama’ and continuation of the first chapter, in which the pretexts for persecution 
encountered throughout the book – the supposed ‘stupidity, vileness, laziness, 
aggressiveness, nymphomania, paganism’ or what have you of sundry ‘savages’ – could be 
exposed in their intimate links with the ideology of the racist international and its attendant 
social structures. 
 
Though a draft of the second chapter on the savage as ‘bad soldier’ can be found in the Jesi 
archives,13 the only other part of the project which has been published, also in appendix to 
the second edition of Cultura di destra is a draft of the first chapter – though it is focused 
                                                      
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 266. This political valorisation of ‘barbarism’ could also be made to resonate with Jesi’s literary 
valorisation of the ‘savage’, which in his vampire fable La casa incantata [The Enchanted House] (1960) 
repeatedly appears as a positive adjective, emblematic of a ‘choice of authenticity and spontaneity’. See 
Emanuela Zignol, ‘La notte, il vampiro, il ritorno nella narrativa di Furio Jesi’, Studi novecenteschi 27 (60) (2000), 
p. 300.  
12 Ibid., 266-7. 
13 According to Andrea Cavalletti, it is incomplete and still at an early stage of elaboration, and not of the quality 
of composition and thought one is used to from Jesi. Interestingly, however, its principal examples are drawn 
from the discrimination of African-American soldiers in the US armed forces. Personal communication from 
Andrea Cavalletti, 14 February 2018. 
primarily on the racialisation of the Southern Italian proletariat, and the related figure of the 
‘dirty savage’. The short text anchors its analysis documents from two different sources. The 
first is a reader’s letter from a 1973 issue of the FIAT-owned newspaper La Stampa, 
contrasting the filthy conditions of Southern migrants’ quarters in Turin with the ethos of 
cleanliness supposedly governing the lives of the city’s autochtonous poor from an earlier 
generation. The others are a number of excerpts the from writings by Edmondo De Amicis – 
whose children’s novel Cuore (1886) is a crucial milestone in the construction of a national 
literary ideology in Italy – bearing respectively on De Amicis’s depiction of the relation 
between Southern and Northern Italians, and on his visit to the Jewish ghetto in Amsterdam. 
It is worth noting here Jesi’s deliberate and inspired choice of examples from his own native 
city, Turin, in opening up a discourse on the ‘racist international’ – in Cultura di destra this 
would take an even more autobiographical inflection, namely in Jesi’s use of nationalist 
speeches by his grandfather Percy Chirone as objects of analysis.14 The pedagogical intent of 
this operation is also evident enough: Jesi begins from the most banal, quotidian of examples, 
a reader’s letter, to indicate how the invidious contrast between the clean Turinese poor and 
their dirty Southern counterparts is founded on what he terms an ‘aggressive analysis’, 
saturated with a rhetoric of ‘blood’ (the La Stampa reader refers to herself as a Torinese puro 
sangue). This racializing analysis is founded on the systematic misrepresentation of the social 
conditions that lie behind the supposed ‘filth’ of the migrant areas – an analysis at whose core 
is the ill-concealed desire for aggression. Jesi then pivots from this hostile horror for the 
different to its manifestation in the writings of De Amicis. The move has a certain dialectical 
edge, since De Amicis is notable precisely for his nationalist effort to unify Italians across their 
differences. Here Jesi shows how in De Amicis’s depictions of the counter between Southern 
and Northern Italians dirt is no longer a mark of difference but a passing obstacle to grasp the 
fundamental sameness and equality among Italians – which is in turn founded on a populist 
ideology of labour, in which, to quote a passage from De Amicis highlighted by Jesi, ‘work 
does not make you dirty’ (one can see how these reflections would have rather smoothly 
opened up onto the projected third chapter on the ‘bad worker’). The contrast between the 
‘good dirt’ of the ‘good (Italian) worker’ (Northern or Southern) and the ‘dirty savage’ is 
evoked through a long quotation from De Amicis’s virulently anti-Semitic ‘aggressive 
description’ of the Amsterdam ghetto: 
 
It was a labyrinth of narrow lanes, dark and filthy, flanked by ruined houses that look as if a kick 
would bring them down. …  Before all the doors and upon the broken steps, old second-hand 
goods were exposed for sale. Refuse of furniture, fragments of weapons, devotional objects, rags 
of uniform, remains of instruments, old iron, fringes, rags; everything that is nameless in any 
human tongue, everything that is spoiled by moth, or rust, or fire, or ruin, or dissipation or 
sickness, or misery, or death; everything that is despised by servants, rejected by pawnbrokers, 
thrown aside by beggars or overlooked by beasts; everything that encumbers, soils, stinks, and 
contaminates; it is all there, in piles and heaps, destined for a mysterious trade and incredible 
transformations. In the midst of this cemetery of things, this Babylon of filth, swarms a people so 
ragged, dirty, and wretched, that beside them the gipsies of the Albaicin of Granada are sweet and 
clean and perfumed. As in all countries, they have borrowed from the people among whom they 
live the color of the skin and the face; but they have preserved the hooked noses, the sharp chins, 
                                                      
14 Cultura di destra, 233-53. Cavalletti also notes that Jesi’s interest in the figure of Ettore Ovazza in Cultura di 
destra and a previously unpublished text on ‘The religion of the Jews in the face of fascism’ (now in the 2011 
edition) can also be given an autobiographical inflection, since Jesi’s own father, Bruno Jesi – a decorated hero 
of Italy’s colonial wars, later target of anti-Semitic racial laws –  was close to Ovazza’s circle. Cultura di destra, 
256.  
the curling hair, and all the features of the Semitic race. There are no words to describe these 
people.15 
 
Inevitably, the words and the description continue, ad nauseam, as though only the 
hyperbolic accumulation of marks of difference and ‘contamination’ could compensate for 
the void at the heart of the idea of race that structures De Amicis’s visual field, animating his 
rhetoric and grammar. The quotidian bigotry of the La Stampa reader and De Amicis’s 
opposition between the good dirt of the Italian same and the bad dirt of the savage Jewish 
other, derive for Jesi from the fact ‘the different (il diverso) are those who, with their dirt due 
to the social order to which they are subjected, represent an obstacle for those who deem 
that order to be both just and agreeable’.16 
 
The masked savage 
Jesi’s insights on the ideological forms and social derivations of the persecution of the 
different find greatest elaboration perhaps in an essay diptych published shortly after 
receiving his commission for Il cattivo selvaggio– ‘L’accusa del sangue: il processo agli ebrei 
di Damasco; metamorfosi del vampiro in Germania’ [The Blood Libel: The Trial of the Jews in 
Damascus; Metamorphosis of the Vampire in Germany].17 It is not my intention here to try to 
properly reconstruct Jesi’s understanding of anti-Semitism as a particularly virulent product 
of the ‘mythological machine’ – that ‘enigmatic device whose functioning produces 
mythologies’18 and ‘mythological facts’ that ‘concentrate into a single extra-temporal, extra-
spatial point, the lights that shine from past and future’.19 Rather, I want to home in on the 
role that the articulation with and contrast with the ‘savage’ plays in Jesi’s conception of anti-
Semitism (and of racializing thought more broadly).  
 
The first part of ‘The Blood Libel’ is a philologically fascinating and historically layered 
exploration of the archival material around a ‘late’ instance of the anti-Semitic accusation of 
ritual murder, from 1840 in Damascus,20 which Jesi treats both as an object of meticulous 
investigation in its own right and as a testing-ground for the paradigm of the mythological 
machine, whose elaboration takes up much of his writing from the 1970s. The question of the 
savage enters into Jesi’s study of the blood libel as part of an effort to circumscribe the 
coordinates of the Catholic anti-Semitism of the late 19th century which largely colours the 
archival material around the Damascus trial of 1840. This anti-Semitism is partially built on 
the scaffolding of an Enlightenment tradition (still very much present, it should be noted, in 
the disputations over the Jewish Question between Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx), which 
castigated Jewish alterity as a kind of ethno-religious ‘particularism’. Commenting on an 1845 
text from the liberal, anti-clerical Italian writer Aurelio Bianchi-Giovini, Jesi notes the 
                                                      
15 Cited in Cultura di destra, 276. English translation from Edmondo De Amicis, Holland and Its People, trans. 
Caroline Tilton (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1881), 257-8. 
16 Cultura di destra, 285. 
17 Furio Jesi, ‘L’accusa del sangue: il processo agli ebrei di Damasco; metamorfosi del vampiro in Germania’, 
Comunità, XXVII, 170 (October 1973), 260-302. Republished as Furio Jesi, L’accusa del sangue. La macchina 
mitologica antisemita, op. cit.  
18 L’accusa del sangue, 6. 
19 L’accusa del sangue, 17. 
20 Though given the aforementioned ‘extra-temporal, extra-spatial’ character of myth the events of 1840 will 
interact with earlier and later occurrences, real or imagined – for instance a ‘mythical’ massacre of Christians 
from 1860. L’accusa del sangue, 20. 
‘contradiction’ evidenced by this kind of ideological stance between, on the one hand, the 
recognition of a continuity between an ancient and Biblical tradition in the midst of the 
modern world, and, on the other, the tendency to desire the termination of particularism. For 
Jesi, this contradiction was an inevitable side-effect of the situation within a capitalist society 
of any non-dominant religious tradition; perhaps more importantly, it signalled the 
identification of the Jewish other as an ‘obstacle’ to a new Enlightened order. Judaism here 
appeared as the foundation of ‘dangerous alterities, incompatible with the homogeneity, the 
“equality” of all the limbs of the social body’; Jesi adding, in an astute comment on the 
capitalist dialectic of Enlightenment, echoing the core thrust of Marx’s famous riposte to 
Bauer, that ‘on this “equality”, the “immortal principle of ‘89” rests the possibility of imposing 
without excessively severe conflicts the norm of capitalist society’.21  
 
Two elements sketched out in the plan for Il cattivo selvaggio are here brought together: first, 
the demarcation between the same-equal and the other-different; second, the way in which 
this demarcation is animated by the ‘homogenising’ drives of an exploitative social order. But 
the articulation between anti-Semitism and the figure of the savage is more specifically 
advanced by Jesi in his effort to try and glean the components of the anti-Semitic mythological 
machine while also periodising its functioning. The virulent myth of Jewish thirst for Christian 
blood is seen by Jesi to combine ‘magical’ (or witchcraft) as well as ‘historico-religious’ 
interpretations. In the latter, it is in being faced with irrefutable proof of Christ’s divinity that 
Jews devise ‘a horrible equivalent of the eucharist’. In a version reported in the early 
seventeenth century, the notion was advanced that it was a catastrophic misunderstanding 
of the meaning of salvation through the blood of Christ (sanguine Christiano) that led to the 
ritual murder of Christians as a way of seeking to reverse the curse of deicide. Here the 
historico-religious dimension is mixed with the idea of a redemptive use of blood, contiguous 
with notions of ritual anthropophagy and vampirism that likened Jews to witches. According 
to Jesi, with the Damascus trial it was not (an anachronistic) witchcraft as much as a kind of 
ethnological variant on the historico-religious accusation of heresy that came to the fore. The 
blood libel thus took on the ‘far more credible and contemporary physiognomy of a trial 
against semi-savages who had massacred a missionary to celebrate their own rites’. What 
emerges from Catholic chronicles and apologias of the trial of Damascus is thus a placement 
of the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew at the hinge between the ‘savage’ and the ‘heretic’. 
Commenting on the 1896 chronicle of the 1840 Damascus blood libel trial, Aceldama, 
promoted by a Sardinian Capuchin Monastery (the missionary who was the alleged victim of 
the Damascene ritual murder, Tommaso da Calangiano, was a Capuchin), Jesi writes that 
Jews, presented as a ‘sacrificing and anthropophagous’ people, were seen to manifest 
 
a singular admixture of civilisation and ‘savage’ nature, of culture (albeit in the most negative 
sense, as refined hypocrisy, shrewdness, cunning mimesis) and cannibalistic drives. The accusation 
directed at them – in their devotion to ritual homicides – was not of the kind aimed at pure and 
simple ‘cannibal’ savages, but neither was it the one reserved for heretics deemed guilty of human 
sacrifices. ‘Savages’ were wholly ‘savages’, they did not possess any glimmer of civilisation; their 
evil belonged to the demons making use of their ignorance. But heretics, though deemed to be 
murderers of children, were not of a stock [stirpe] tending toward evil through their intrinsic 
nature: they did not possess [here Jesi quotes from Aceldama] ‘frighteningly expanded … the 
[cranial] protuberance of the crude, ferocious and bloodthirsty spirit’.22 
                                                      
21 L’accusa del sangue, 22. 
22 L’accusa del sangue, 33. 
 
Jesi’s documentary, mythological and historical analysis of the materials produced around the 
Damascus trial thus reveals the specificity of late 19th century Catholic racism, which cannot 
be simply equated with the theories of white supremacy of a Gobineau or Chamberlain, or 
with their interwar epigoni, for instance – as Jesi notes – the intellectuals behind Difesa della 
razza, the foremost journal of Italian racial science under Fascism. Here it is worth quoting 
Jesi’s reflections on the specificity of this figure of racism and its triangulation with anti-Black 
racism as well as with the racial and anthropological figure of the savage: 
 
But [unlike Fascist racism] 19th century anti-Semitic Catholic racism does not include under the 
same accusation of ‘inferiority’ Blacks and Jews. It consists instead of the will to condemn the 
heinous deeds of a people which because of its intrinsic, ‘phrenological’ (racial) nature, inexorably 
tends towards evil, to the ferocity of ‘savages’ and which nevertheless (unlike Blacks) is not wholly 
‘savage’ but rather has hypocritically and externally civilised itself – and which has thus been able 
to continue to satisfy its blood-thirsty instincts within the very fabric of ‘civilised’ societies. We are 
not dealing with a racism oriented towards the general perspective of all the human ‘races’, but 
with a racism that aims to distinguish, among apparently ‘civilised’ men, and not among the 
others, those who hypocritically mask under semblances of civility their true ‘savage’ nature, their 
‘crude, ferocious and bloodthirsty spirit’. This racism is therefore not identical to the one of 
colonisers faced with ‘savages’, but it is one that is partially analogous to the one that endures, 
for example, in the United States against Blacks: which strikes not ‘savages’ in their pure state, but 
masked ‘savages’, those whom with cunning and hypocrisy have managed to feign ‘civilisation’.23 
 
This leitmotiv of the Jew as a kind of savage in disguise is also linked to the sordid myths of 
blood rites in Catholic anti-Semitism which ‘implicitly recognised a demonic bind between the 
“anthropophagy” and “ritual vampirism” of the Jews and their cunning (which was indeed, 
diabolical in kind)’.24 The result of this network of mythical, magical and racial images is a form 
of persecution which rather than a witch-hunt is a ‘hunt of the “savage” camouflaged as 
civilised man, a hunt for The Wild Man Within’.25 Crucially, Jesi will argue that the 
mythologist’s perspective can enhance and complement a social and historical analysis of the 
kind of racism that treats the Jew as a diabolically cunning ‘savage’ and foreign body in the 
midst of Christian civil society. Namely, ‘the study of the mythological fact allows one to add 
some considerations regarding the particular modality of this marginalisation [of the Jew] and 
regarding the reaction to the “other” and the “different” [diverso] that conditions these 
                                                      
23 L’accusa del sangue, 34. The section of the essay which follows this statement includes another variant of 
racial difference as embodied in the anti-Semitic imaginary: Jesi draws on Crowds and Power by Elias Canetti (an 
author he both translated into Italian and wrote illuminatingly about) to comment on the recurrence of the 
image of the ‘clawed hand’ of the Jew, symbolising the threat of an Other who can either snatch children (the 
murderer) or money (the usurer). As Jesi comments: ‘The Jew is the other [il diverso] because he possesses cash 
money as well as that metaphysical money that consists of the Old Testament. To the Christian, he lends cash 
money and secret money, gold and the Torah, but in exchange and with the ample interest of a concrete and 
spectral usury, he reaches out his hand, grasping; he is the other who grasps and drags into his secret the 
debtors: ritual victims, rather than the initiated. He is the “butcher”, the “slaughterer”, because in his different 
[diverso] world, the Christian can enter only as an animal fit to slaughter not as a neophyte’ (36). 
24 L’accusa del sangue, 37. 
25 L’accusa del sangue, 36. Jesi’s reference is to E. Dudley and M.E. Novak (eds.), The Wild Man Within: An Image 
in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism (Pitssburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972). For 
a political genealogy of the racialised ‘manhunt’, see Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: A Philosophical History, 
trans. Steven Rendall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); for an extremely rich treatment of the 
connections between the European figure of the ‘wild man’ and the colonial projection of the ‘savage’, see Roger 
Bartra, El mito del salvaje (México: FCE, 2011). 
modalities’.26 By contrast with the modern permutations of ‘vampirism’ which Jesi will 
explore, in fascinating connection to the psycho-political fate of feudalism, in the second part 
of L’accusa del sangue,27 Jesi defines the specificity of the anti-Semitic blood libel by way of 
three observations: first, the accusation of anthropophagy against Jews is actually pre-
Christian and plays a marginal role in Christian anti-Semitism; second, the blood libel proper 
emerges around the year 1000 in a Christian milieu; third, its specific connection is to the 
theme of infanticide. Whence the conclusion, which draws on the motif of a mythic inversion 
dear to Kerényi, that the blood libel is born of a ‘negative reversal of Christ’s sacrifice (the 
“deicide” people continued to make Christian blood flow, after having stained itself with the 
blood of Christ), united with the survivals of the memories of child sacrifices among “pagans”, 
which thus acquired the value of ritual repetitions of the crucifixion’.28 This mythical inversion 
or reversal is intimately linked for Jesi to the inversions and reversals that mark the racist 
imaginary of otherness and difference: 
 
As the ‘different’ [diverso] par excellence, the Jew thus took on the precise physiognomy of a 
human being symmetrically opposed to the Christian: not only, like the ‘pagans’, did the Jew 
practice bizarre, risible, clumsy rituals, he did exactly the contrary of what Christians did. And we 
know that these precise symmetries, these couples of opposites, are peculiar to the functioning 
of the ‘mythological machine’. … The documents related to the ‘blood libel’ allow us to observe a 
specific functioning of the ‘mythological machine’: the reversal of myth is deliberate and is carried 
out in parallel to the conservation, at the sacral level, of the myth itself.29 
 
The archival exploration of the Damascene blood libel trial of 1840, and its discursive and 
ideological milieu, thus allows Jesi to make explicit the link between myth and racism already 
at work in the pedagogical project of Il cattivo selvaggio, arguing that in this case the 
mythological machine operates through ‘the experience of the “different” (of the different 
man [uomo diverso]) which issues into the configuration of a difference that is symmetrical 
contraposition, of the kind that exists between Good and Evil: the “different” is not only the 
different, but the contrary’. It is worth noting also that Jesi integrates into this account of the 
mythical production of race and the racial production of myth both a psychological element 
(in which the blood libel is a veritable ‘transfert’, imposed upon and punished in others, of 
the anxious guilt that plagues Christians as they contemplate the mystery of the cross) and a 
socio-economic one (with Jesi acknowledging that the Damascus trial also manifests historical 
factors that relate more closely to the ‘economic, social and political developments of the 
accusation against the “different” than to psychological-religious aspects’).30 
 
Knowability of the savage 
As we have just seen, the figure of the ‘savage’ allows Jesi better to specify the particularity 
of the racial ideology that animates late 19th century Catholic anti-Semitism, and to delineate 
                                                      
26 L’accusa del sangue, 37. 
27 The relation between the figures of the vampire, the Jew and the savage, as explored in Jesi’s writing, is too 
complex to do any justice to here. I hope to prolong the analysis sketched out in this article in a subsequent 
article dealing with the way in which Jesi’s understanding of the metamorphoses of the vampire and their 
entanglement with both economic and mythic frames can also contribute to reconstructing from his writings a 
theory of the ‘racial machine’. Such an inquiry will require engagement, by way of counterpoint, with Jesi’s 
vampire novel: L’ultima notte, ed. Giulio Schiavoni (Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2015). See also Zignol, op. cit. 
28 L’accusa del sangue, 39. 
29 L’accusa del sangue, 40. 
30 L’accusa del sangue, 41. 
the operations of the mythological machine that produces the blood libel as a kind of 
‘mythological fact’. But the problem of the ‘savage’ is also operative at another level of Jesi’s 
work from the 1970s, namely that of the nexus between mythology and anthropology.31 It is 
present in his posthumously published work on the jurist, historian and mythologist Johann 
Jakob Bachofen, namely in an incisive analysis of the efforts to equate or to distinguish 
between ancients and savages in 19th century mythological sciences, as a way of testing ‘the 
epistemological models used for multiple categories of the different (diverso)’.32 We also 
encounter it in Jesi’s exploration of the links between the sciences of myth, the emergence of 
colonial ethnology and esotericism in the Enlightenment, all oriented – as he shows through 
the peculiar figure of the freemason, occultist and ethnologist Dom Pernety – towards a 
‘global science of man’.33 And we also find it in Jesi’s monograph on Rousseau, where, 
intervening in the debates generated by the writings on the Genevan philosopher by Lévi-
Strauss, Starobinski and Derrida, he presents the figure of the ‘noble savage’ as a non-
mythical symbol that served to investigate the present and make anthropology possible.34 
But arguably the crucial instance of the savage in Jesi’s critical (and political) epistemology of 
myth is to be found in the essay ‘Conoscibilità della festa’ (Knowability of the Festival) which 
served as the introductory essay to Jesi’s 1977 anthology of texts anthropological texts on the 
‘festival’, Le festa. For Jesi, the practice of anthologising was part and parcel of a critical 
method of composition partially indebted to Walter Benjamin,35 but which, in the brief 
methodological prelude to the anthology, he captures through Ezra Pound’s image of the 
‘rose in the steel dust’: ‘It is important to grasp, anthologically, through citations and as the 
outcome of composition, the rose, to be able to become fully aware of the steel dust, of how 
much the steel dust is harshness, obligatory unknowability, precarious or ruined collectivity, 
                                                      
31 On this nexus, see especially Furio Jesi, Mito (Milan: Mondadori, 1980 [1973]) and Materiali mitologici. Mito 
e antropologia nella cultura mitteleuropea, new ed., ed. Andrea Cavalletti (Turin: Einaudi, 2001 [1979]). 
32 Furio Jesi, Bachofen, ed. Andrea Cavalletti (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2005), 25-30. Jesi links this question to 
the way in which in mythology and anthropology difference (diversità) is linked to the question of the secret and 
the latter to what may be difference par excellence, namely temporal difference. In this frame, savages, unlike 
ancients, suffer from an excessive contemporaneity. For an appearance of the figure of the savage in Jesi’s work 
on ancient myth, see his brief piece on Book X of The Odyssey: ‘Polifemo e il selvaggio’ (1971), in Marco Belpoliti 
and Enrico Manera (eds.), Riga 31: Furio Jesi (Milan: Marcos y Marcos, 2010), 120-5. 
33 Furio Jesi, ‘Ermeneutica e scienza del mito (1750-1850)’, in Mitologie intorno all’illuminismo (Bergamo: 
Pierluigi Lubrina, 1990 [1972]), 165-70. On Pernety, see also Bachofen, 25-26. 
34 ‘The state of nature is thus not necessarily the effective prehistory of civil society, nor is natural goodness the 
effective prehistoric antecedent from which emerged – with a “leap” – the ethical virtue of civilised man (uomo 
civile). State of nature and natural goodness are symbols employed by Rousseau as methodological instruments 
to investigate contemporary reality. … Rousseau can rightly be considered as the founder of modern ethnology 
because he was perfectly cognizant of the lack of objective elements on which to ground the study both of 
primordial humanity and of living “savages”, he pushed for a search for precise data on these matters, and – 
given the documentary possibilities at his disposal – he confined himself to using arbitrary reconstructions of 
the life of natural man as symbolic methodological instruments, as particularly meaningful “exploits” 
(“imprese”), useful for the technique of inquiring into civilised man. Didactic exploits and symbols possess an 
internal veracity’. Furio Jesi, Che cosa ha ‘veramente’ detto Rousseau (Roma: Ubaldini, 1972), 56-7. I think it 
would be very productive to follow the resonances and contrasts between, on the one hand, Jesi’s work on the 
savage and the figures of il diverso, and, on the other, the work of other contemporaneous Italian historians 
who tried to excavate the political and philosophical origins of the figure of the savage. See especially Giuliano 
Gliozzi (ed.), La scoperta dei selvaggi. Antropologia e colonialismo da Colombo a Diderot (Milan: Principato 
Editore, 1971) and Stefano Landucci, I filosofi e i selvaggi (Turin: Einaudi, 2014 [1972]).  
35 On Jesi’s compositional method see Andrea Cavalletti, ‘La maniera compositiva di Furio Jesi’, in Jesi, Materiali 
mitologici, op. cit. 
cultural ruin, though one which is able to form, in the eye of the epistemologist, the rose’.36 
In the specific case of La festa, Jesi’s aim was to make evident how ‘a traditional seam –
composite but traceable back to some fundamental common elements – within the so-called 
social sciences bound to bourgeois culture is ultimately incapable of attaining a knowability 
of the festival that is not the mere recognition of the unknowability of the festival’.37 What 
role does the savage play in this vexed matter of knowability? 
 
Jesi’s starting point here, by analogy with a position he already articulates regarding myth in 
his writings on Kerényi,38 is that modernity is marked by a caesura with the festive: we enjoy 
‘no historical relationship – which is not that of the mere, partial and precarious, observation 
of the different (diversi) – with the “sense of festivity”’, and can at most grasp the ‘cruel 
festival’ that makes itself felt in the ‘collective experience of violence and pain’.39 In this 
predicament, the ethnologist – even or especially when he is an ethnologist of his own 
modern tribe, as in Jesi’s example of Marcel Proust – necessarily become a kind of spy, who 
aims to become visible in the eyes of the ‘different’ (diversi) ‘as an other [diverso] who 
nevertheless feigns to be an equal and who can be accepted in his fiction’.40 But the 
ethnologist’s externality to the festivals of the other means that he is a spy in a mise-en-scène 
of his own making and in that sphere  
 
the only material which is autonomous from the organizing/spying of the ethnologist is the 
difference of the different [la diversità dei diversi]: the fact that the different are objectively 
susceptible to being spied upon. Difference and the being able to be spied upon [spiabilità] of the 
different are one and the same thing. One can in fact only spy the different. It is impossible to 
penetrate incognito into the sphere of the equal or the same without being recognised. Which 
also means that it is impossible to spy from a hidden position one’s own I and what is identical to 
it.41 
 
As Jesi goes on to argue, if ethnology and anthropology are also, consciously or otherwise, an 
inquiry into the relation between the ego and its equals via the detour of the different – so 
that the different play the role of counterparts – then the ethnographic scene of the festival 
plays the crucial role of presenting the other, the savage, in the maximum density of its 
difference. Here Jesi underscores a kind of paradox of the anthropology of the savage, namely 
a kind of universalist epistemology – one which is of course not incompatible with the racial 
                                                      
36 Furio Jesi (ed.), La festa. Antropologia etnologia folklore (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1977), 3. The theme of 
the ruin (maceria) is key to Jesi’s reading of Pound, see ‘Parodia e mito nella poesia di Ezra Pound’, in Letteratura 
e mito, 200, 207. But see also the final essay in the same collection of essays, ‘L’esperienza religiosa di Apuleio’, 
in which Jesi writes of the ‘hour of the crisis of classical culture’ as the perennially lasting instant in which ‘the 
symbol reveals itself as the ruin of the past or the future’ (240-1).  
37 La festa, 3. 
38 See the first three essays in Materiali mitologici, 3-80. 
39 I quote ‘Conoscibilità della festa’ here from its most recent and available edition: Il tempo della festa, 65. See 
also the important observation on how the impossibility of the festival leads cultural nostalgia to mistake the 
collective experience of pain for the true, if negative, festival (66). Jesi sees this misunderstanding still at work 
in some contemporary anthropological literature, for instance, in what he sees as Roger Caillois ‘equivocal 
middle path between ethnographic observation and the exegesis of a different (diversa) society’ (67). He goes 
on to note Horkheimer and Adorno’s use of Caillois in Dialectic of Enlightenment, and the latter’s resonance with 
what he sardonically refers to as ‘the savages that the Freud of Totem und Tabu paraded through the streets of 
Vienna’ (69).  
40 Il tempo della festa, 76. 
41 Il tempo della festa, 77. 
machinery identified elsewhere, and for which the maximum of difference can also turn into 
a maximum of humanity: 
 
precisely because the festival is the acme of [the savages’] human peculiarity, in the festival state 
they possess and exhibit also the maximum density, the maximum concentration, of their 
universal humanity. They are thus, exceptionally, ‘men like everyone else’ in the very moment in 
which they are more different than ever. Humanity in its maximum concentration coincides 
paradoxically with the acme of difference.42 
 
By way of a further, and related, paradox, the festival thus construed also permits the 
ethnologist or anthropologist to approximate a collective experience that otherwise seems to 
be impossible with his ‘equals’, equals who are no longer such in a society in which the only 
festivals are cruel and catastrophic. The construction of the festival in the ‘bourgeois culture’ 
of the anthropologist thus reveals its ‘unknowability’; it is not an immersion of the equal or 
same into the scene and field of the other and different, but rather ‘a situation into which the 
ethnologist lowers the different in order to make use of them with the aim of recovering in 
them both solidarity with his fellows and his own liberation from solidarity with his ego’.43 It 
is on the basis of this incisive critique of the epistemology of anthropology, and the politics 
and subjectivity of ethnography, that Jesi can sketch his model of the anthropological 
machine, which he defines as follows: 
 
the complex mechanism that produces images of men, anthropological models, referred to the 
ego and others, with all the possible varieties of difference [diversita] (that is of extraneousness 
from the ego). These models can be rationally appreciated, while what cannot be is what should 
be at the heart of the machine, its unmoved motor: man, who can be an ego or an other, and who 
instead is an other even when he is an ego. All the innumerable others [altri], whose 
epistemological [gnoseologici] models originate in the anthropological machine – in other words, 
all the images of man that man can know – can be either the epiphanies of true man 
(independently from the fact of  being known: therefore of real man in and for himself, of the 
symbol resting within itself of universal man), which would be found within the machine and with 
its presence would make it function and produce, or the result of the production of the empty 
machine. Uncertainty as to whether the anthropological machine is empty or full, as to whether it 
possess an internal unmoved prime mover, derives from the impenetrability of the walls of the 
machine itself. This impenetrability is a postulate that stands as a conditio sine qua non of the 
epistemological usability of the model ‘anthropological machine’.44 
 
In the specific case of the ‘savage’ festival, the anthropological machine, with its inscrutable 
engine and relentless productivity, operates in and through the coexistence of two 
hypotheses, namely that (1) ‘from the sphere of the different there proceeds a movement 
towards the observer (a movement crystallised in the festival)’ and (2) that the observer 
carried out ‘an operation of exploitation of the different (through their lowering into the 
festive state)’ – a coexistence that, as Jesi notes, is particularly evident in the writings of 
explicitly racist colonial operators, but which is also perceivable in the work of non- or anti-
colonialist anthropologists.45 Most significantly, as the anthology of writings goes on to 
expose through its method of composition (in extracts from André Thevet, Joseph-François 
Lafitau, Sigfrid Rafael Karsten, Josef Haekel), the two hypotheses generated by the 
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43 Il tempo della festa, 80.  
44 Il tempo della festa, 82. 
45 Il tempo della festa, 84.  
anthropological machine vis-à-vis the festival divide themselves into the categorisation of two 
types of exceptional collective ritual, namely the peaceful festival, understood as a ‘virtuous 
collective experience’, the ‘periodic suspension of duty and representation’, and the warrior 
festival. It is in the latter that we see the anthropologist reproducing, in his own projection 
onto the ‘savage’ scene, the hierarchies of civilisation we had already encountered in Jesi’s 
project on the ignoble savage: 
 
That collectivity, in a state of ‘savage’ warrior festivity, further allows the ethnologist to split or 
double his ego: ‘I’ is another, because it is absorbed in the fullness of the universally human, of 
the human mass in solidarity grasped at the zenith of its ferocity – and thus in a state of radical 
difference [diversità] from the ‘civilised’ being of the ethnologist. In the ‘I’ of the ethnologist there 
is the ‘I’ of the ‘savage’: the ethnologist can observe him with detachment, can separate himself 
from him, because the ethnologist is ‘civilised’. ‘Civilised’ is the gaze of the observer, ‘savage’ is 
the ego of the observer. The difference between the ego and the gaze is all the more severe to 
the extent that the ‘I’ shows itself as ‘savage’ in relation to what stands as the touchstone of 
civilisation: the ought [il dover essere] and representation.46 
 
This passage, which we would need to complement with an exploration of the central role of 
time in Jesi’s conception of the festival (and which also relates to that particular modern 
‘festival’ that was the Spartacist revolt, between cruel disaster and ‘virtuous collective 
experience’), is particularly significant because it adds, to the investigation of the racial 
machinery of difference in the outline for Il cattivo selvaggio, a sense of the deeper 
epistemological and subjective structures at work in the figuration of the ‘savage’ as a model 
of alterity. But the essay on the ‘Knowability of the Festival’ is especially important for our 
purposes because it intimately ties the political perspective of Jesi’s studies of racism (his 
solidarity with what he provocatively calls ‘movements of barbarism against civilisation’) with 
the complex epistemological and methodological reflections that govern the project of La 
festa, along with so much of his work on the mythological and anthropological machine. This 
nexus of politics and epistemology is articulated in the conclusion of the essay in a manner 
perhaps unmatched in the rest of Jesi’s corpus.  
 
Jesi, continuing that preoccupation with temporality which, as we just noted, is so critical to 
this period of his work, and prolonging the essay’s preoccupation with ‘festive time’, reframes 
the problem of anthropological difference in terms of the everyday (il quotidiano), telling us 
that in the ‘instant’ when the latter is unveiled it turns into the different (il diverso): ‘man, in 
the instant in which he appears in the festive state, is the different. The everyday in the phase 
of its occultation and man in the non-festive state are the known (il noto) and the same 
(l’uguale)’ – while the ethnologist or anthropologist cannot unveil himself, and accordingly 
cannot appear to himself in the festive state. The condition of the anthropologist – which 
prolongs the reflections on the mythologist’s distance from myth that already govern Jesi’s 
wrestling Kerényi – is marked thus by the ‘lack of epiphanic experiences’, by the fact that the 
anthropologist can only operate on ‘machines’, on functioning epistemological models like 
the mythological machine and the anthropological machine whose core, or ‘mover’ is 
inaccessible (in its plenitude or void).47 This enigma at the heart of the machines, Jesi notes, 
may constitute their greatest cunning, what allows them to conserve or reproduce the very 
structures of social domination that permit them to operate. Perhaps, Jesi muses, this 
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insistent allusion to an inaccessible core (myth, man) is a way to allow a supposed 
disenchantment or scepticism de facto to believe only in the machines themselves 
(mythology not myth, anthropology not man, we could say). Now, contrary to the suggestion 
one might project onto Jesi – namely that what is required is a metaphysical effort to 
disactivate the machines themselves – ‘Knowability of the Festival’ ends on very different 
counsel. What demands to be destroyed are not the machines as such – which, Jesi pointedly 
notes, would reform like so many hydra’s heads – but ‘the situation that makes machines true 
and productive. The possibility of this destruction is exclusively political’.48 As he continues: 
 
To destroy the situation that makes true and productive the machines – the ‘anthropological 
machine’, the ‘mythological machine’ – means, moreover, to push beyond bourgeois culture, not 
merely to try to slightly deform its frontier barriers.49 
 
Echoing Jesi, we could say such an intuition is all the more relevant for those who today, 
drawing inspiration from his work, might seek to dismantle the racialising machine that has 
the figure of the savage as one of its enduring operators.  
                                                      
48 Il tempo della festa, 106. This emphasis on a political rather than ideological or metaphysical destruction – an 
important counter to a potentially ‘idealist’ reading of Jesi’s work – is also evident in the essay’s final lines: ‘The 
epistemological [gnoseologico] problem cannot be isolated, makde autonomous, separated from the political 
and social problem: a greater degree of knowability of the festival can be a good or an evil only within a 
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49 Il tempo della festa, 107. 
